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Abstract
Cloud computing is the fastest growing and promising ﬁeld in the sector of service provision. It is a very trendy situation for security
implementation in the Cloud. Thus, security restrictions are increasing on users and service providers as the growth of Cloud
environment. The purpose of this paper is to suggest a better and efﬁcient integrity veriﬁcation technique for data (referred as “Cloud
Audit”). The building blocks of our technique are a variant of the Paillier homomorphic cryptography system with homomorphic
tag and combinatorial batch codes. A Paillier Homomorphic Cryptography (PHC) system used to obtain homomorphic encryption
on data blocks. Homomorphic tags along with the Paillier cryptography system assigns a special veriﬁable value to each data block,
which helps us in unleashing data operations on this block. Combinatorial batch codes are used to assign and store integral data
into different distributed cloud sever. To demonstrate our approach, we have implemented an application based on Hadoop and
MapReduce framework. We have tested this application based on various parameters. Effectiveness of the proposed method has
been shown by the experimental results. Our method has shown large improvement over the other modern methods.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
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1. Introduction
Cloud Computing (CC)1,2 is an on-demand service over a network servers which are hosted on Internet to process,
store and organize the data, rather than a local server or personal computer. The Cloud services and applications runs
on distributed network which provides a virtual resource for end user. This resources could be accessed by standard
Internet and networking protocols. Data integrity veriﬁcation3 is one of the massive responsibility with cloud data,
because the probability of involvement in malicious activity of a cloud user and cloud provider is very high. There
are many way to address this problem. User can use encryption and decryption process. However, it requires huge
computing time and functional overheads. Applying data auditing may be the other way to address this problem.
Classical approaches for data auditing are Provable Data Possession (PDP) techniques4–7,8 and Proof of
Retrievability (PoR) techniques9–13. However, there are many difﬁculties with PDP and PoR techniques. These
techniques can be employed only for encrypted ﬁles and allow only a limited number of queries. Further, the above
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schemes are not suitable for the batch auditing because of their computation overhead. The beneﬁts of these techniques
only depend on the preprocessing steps which user can apply on outsource data ﬁle. There is a settlement between
dynamic data operations and privacy preservation. But, some of the schemes do not preserve privacy. There is a
trade-off between cost of communication and storage overhead. However, some of these PDP schemes require high
cost for less storage.
There are some schemes14–17 which assign audit tasks to single Third Party Auditor (TPA). TPA is an authentic and
trusted entity that independently manages the data audits.
To address the above problems, Saxena et al.3 have proposed multiple TPA scheme, in which various synchronous
audit sessions from different users are handled by each single TPA simultaneously. We assume for our scheme that
cloud service provider must be trustworthy.
Major contributions of our approach are as follows:
1. We provide public audit structure with multiple TPA for privacy preserve audit and data storage security.
2. Our approach supports dynamic data operations and provides an effective solution for public auditing with
multiple TPA.
3. Proposed scheme can handle various efﬁcient and synchronous audit sessions from multiple users.
4. Effectiveness of the proposed scheme is demonstrated through implementations and experimentations.
Organization. We have organized the remaining paper in three sections. Section 2 will discuss our proposed
scheme for data integrity veriﬁcation. In section 3, we describe the support of dynamic data operations. Security and
performance analysis are given in Section 4. Finally, in section 5, we presents the conclusions of our work.
2. Proposed Scheme
In this section, ﬁrst, we present the notation related to our approach. Then we describe the details of Paillier
HomomorphicCryptography system (PHC)18. Subsequently, we illustrate the system model and details of our scheme.
2.1 Notation and preliminaries
1. F and F[i ]: a ﬁle and the i th data block of F .
2. E(•) and D(•): the encryption and decryption algorithms.
3. H (•): a hash function.
4. φ(•): Euler’s totient function.
5. μ(•): a Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) which maps: μ: {0, 1}k × {0, 1}l −→ {0, 1}l .
6. σ(•) : a Pseudo-Random Permutation (PRP) which maps: σ : {0, 1}k × {0, 1 . . .n} −→ {0, 1 . . .n}.
7. p and q: two different odd prime numbers of the same length.
8. J : Multiplication of two prime numbers p and q .
9. r1, r2: random numbers selected from the Galois ﬁeld.
10. T and Ti : all block tags and i th tag of T .
11. v: number of veriﬁcation.
12. R: number of blocks required for each challenge.
13. kt : encryption key for tag.
14. kd : decryption key for tag.
15. Z and Z∗: group on integer numbers.
16. c: number of blocks that choose for challenge operation.
17. r : number of deleted blocks from total ﬁle blocks.
2.2 Paillier homomorphic cryptography system
We use a variant of PHC system18 for encryption and decryption. Group of integer numbers (ZN and Z∗N ) are
utilized such that ZN × Z∗N is isomorphic to Z∗2N . PHC system has three parts which are described below.
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2.2.1 Key-generation
In ﬁrst part, PHC system generates public and private keys for encryption and decryption, respectively na random
number which is used to encrypt plain-text. It applies Euler’s totient function on two different odd prime numbers to
generate these keys. The procedure of key-generation is summarized as follows.
1. An entity chooses two different odd prime numbers p and q of the same length.
2. Calculate J = pq and Euler’s totient function on J is φ(J ) = [(p − 1)(q − 1)].
3. Assure that
(a) gcd(J, φ(J )) = 1.
(b) For any integer a > 0, we have (1 + J )a = (1 + a J ) mod J 2.
(c) As a consequence, the order of (1 + J ) ∈ Z∗J 2 is J i.e. (1 + J )J = (1 mod J 2) and (1 + J )a = (1 mod J 2)
for any 1 < a < J .
4. Selects a random r Z∗J such that gcd(L(r J mod J 2), J ) = 1, where L(x) = (x − 1)/J .
5. Return public key (J ), private key (J, φ(J )) and a random number (r) of the system.
2.2.2 Encryption
Second part of PHC system encrypts plain text using public key. Let m ∈ ZJ be a plain-text to be encrypted and
r ∈ Z∗J is a random number. With the deﬁnition of isomorphism, cipher-text can be obtained by function f that maps
plain text as:
ZJ × Z∗J −→ Z∗J 2 and
c = E(mmod J, rmod J ) = f (m, r) = [(1 + J )mr˙ J mod J 2]; where c ∈ Z∗J 2 .
2.2.3 Decryption algorithm
In the last part of PHC system, user can efﬁciently decrypts the encrypted text using its private key (J, φ(J )).
Decryption steps are given as follows.
1. Set cˆ := [cφ(n) mod J 2] where c is cipher-text.
2. Set mˆ := (cˆ − 1)/J . (Note that all this is carried out over the integers.)
3. After decryption, plain-text is given by m := [mˆ · φ(J )−1 mod J 2]
2.3 Cloud audit: proposed data integrity veriﬁcation scheme
In this paper, we propose multiple and distributed third party (Cloud Audit), which shares the massive load of batch
auditing among multiple TPAs by load balancing techniques. Our scheme works on three tiers which are given in the
following.
1. Cloud Users: Any consumer of cloud service could be represented as a cloud user. Our assumption for cloud
user is that they have limited resources and are not capable of performing computation intensive jobs, such as
different auditing tasks (privacy preserving data integrity veriﬁcation).
2. Multiple TPA: TPA is an authentic and authorize entity. Data integrity veriﬁcation and batch auditing tasks are
managed by TPAs. Further, it is also responsible for Service Level Agreement (SLA) and different legal issues of
cloud providers. To accomplish the load balance task and perform batch audit, we use multiple TPAs.
3. Cloud Service Provider (CSP): CSPs are the organizations who provide sufﬁcient infrastructure and resources
to as a service to the end users. Distribution of resources could be within many servers, which are situated on
around the world.
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Fig. 1. Startup Phase.
Our proposed Cloud Audit technique works in two phases: startup and audit phases. Figure 1 and Fig. 2 describe
the working of startup and audit phases within the three tiers, respectively.
A. Startup Phase: The startup performs four tasks which are described in the following.
1. Request for Data Storage: In the ﬁrst step of startup phase, cloud user sends a request for storing the data of a
ﬁle F to the CSP group.
2. Storing the File F: At CSP end, ﬁle F is converted into n data blocks by ﬁle partitioning operation. To maintain
high availability, CSP makes replica of each block two times. We assume that CSP group uses Combinatorial
Batch Code (CBC) C(n, N, k,m, t) to store the ﬁle F . Thus, a ﬁle of n data blocks is to be stored among m
servers in a speciﬁc way that any k of the n data blocks can be recovered by at max t blocks from each server,
and the total blocks stored in m servers are N. Initially, CSP group performs setup operation and generates public
encryption key of a TPA group and two random numbers. Steps of this task are summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1. Setup Operation
3. Homomorphic TAG Generation: In the second step, CSP group performs a homomorphic tag generation
process. In this process, each CSP server individually chooses random sample blocks F1, F2, . . . Fk from total
n data blocks and compute hash value using H ()˙ for each block. These hash values are represented as H (F1),
H (F2), . . . H (Fk). Load balancing mechanism is applied to distribute this process among all CSP servers. Let v
be the number of data blocks is assigned to each CSP server after load balancing. Hence, each CSP server will
generate homomorphic tag for those v number of data blocks. Tag generation process is described in Algorithm 2.
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Algorithm 2. Homomorphic TAG Generation
4. Return Encrypted Tag T : CSP group returns encrypted tag {T } entry, which contains tags Ti for all data blocks
of a cloud user. Although, this tag increases the size of metadata related to ﬁle, yet this tag helps cloud users in
performing dynamic operations on their data without disclosing the content to anyone. This tag also helps TPA
group for data integrity veriﬁcation, which will be described in auditing phase.
B. Auditing Phase: The auditing phase veriﬁes the data integrity by performing ﬁve tasks which are described in the
following.
1. Request for Data Integrity Veriﬁcation: The cloud user uses the encrypted entry and ﬁle information to check
the data integrity. TPA group is responsible to audit the data integrity on behalf users. Hence, user requests the
TPA group for auditing of a ﬁle F by sending the message {F, T } to TPA. TPA group performs the audit task by
sharing the audit load among other TPAs by load balancing method.
2. Challenge: In challenge operation, TPA group may challenge CSP for some random data blocks (c). For this
purpose, TPA group computes ci for the i th challenged block using the public key (kt ) of CSP. Then a message
(r2, ci ) is sent to the CSP server. Details of challenge operation is given in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3. Challenge Operation
3. Proof Generation: In this step, CSP server decrypts the challenge block entry using its private key. Then, it ﬁnds
the positions of the requested challenged data blocks using ci . Finally, sum of the retrieved data blocks (F ′i ) are
calculated and then send the sum (F ′i ) to the TPA group. CSP server also returns the homomorphic veriﬁable tag
(T ′i ) corresponding to F ′i . The tag, T ′i , is already stored on CSP. The procedure for proof generation is described
in Algorithm 4.
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Algorithm 4. Proof Generation
4. Proof Veriﬁcation: This process veriﬁes the homomorphic tags of challenged blocks. To do this, T ′i is decrypted
and the Hash of F ′i is calculated by TPA group. For decryption, TPA group uses their private key kd . The decrypted
tag is compared with generated hash value to check whether they are equal or not using proof veriﬁcation process.
If the result of veriﬁcation process is yes, then it indicates that the integrity of the data blocks (ﬁle) is preserved,
else the data blocks (ﬁle) are manipulated. Summary of the proof veriﬁcation process is given in Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 5. Proof Veriﬁcation
3. Support for Dynamic Data Operations
3.1 Update operation
In some situation, user modiﬁes the existing ﬁle blocks and this modiﬁcation restructures the whole ﬁle. This
operation is known as update operation. To implement the update operation, we use the ﬁrst homomorphic property of
a Paillier cryptography system. This property is described with our notation as follows:
Let m1, m2 be any two ﬁle blocks containing plain-texts such that m1,m2 ∈ ZJ and r1, r2 be two random numbers
such that r1, r2 ∈ Z∗J . First homomorphic property says that the decryption of the product of two cipher-texts is equal
to the sum of their corresponding plain-texts. This could be represented by the following equation
D[E(m1, r1) · E(m2, r2)] = D[E(m1 + m2, r1.r2) mod J 2] = m1 + m2 mod J
Thus, we are able to get the dynamic update operation and the addition of two plain-text without retrieving the
plain-texts.
3.2 Append operation
Sometime, user may add new data block at the end of the stored ﬁles which causes increment in the size of the stored
data. This operation is referred as append operation. To implement this operation, we use the second homomorphic
property of a Paillier cryptography system, which is described with our notation as follows:
For anym1,m2 ∈ ZJ and r1, r2 ∈ Z∗J , decryption of an encrypted plain-text raised to the power of another plain-text
is equal to the product of two plain-texts. This could be expressed by the following equations
D[Em2(m1, r1)] = D[E(m1 · m2, rm21 ) mod J 2] = m1 · m2 mod J
D[Em1(m2, r2)] = D[E(m1 · m2, rm12 ) mod J 2] = m1 · m2 mod J
Thus, we could ensure the dynamic appending of data and multiplication of two plain-text without retrieving
plain-texts.
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Fig. 2. Auditing Phase.
3.3 Delete operation
In some occasions, after saving the data on the cloud, user needs to delete some data blocks. We consider this
operation as delete operation. This can be considered as a specialized update operation because we can replace the
original data blocks with null blocks or any special predetermined symbol blocks.
4. Analysis
This section, ﬁrst, presents the security analysis of our proposed method using binding property of the Paillier
cryptography system. Further, we have discussed the experimental results to judge the performance of our scheme.
4.1 Security analysis
The goal of our technique is to ensure that solely authorized users can read, use, or contribute to the data stored
at CSP. These security controls add another layer of stability against possible threats by cloud users, administrators
and other vulnerable actors on the network. To ensure better security, we use the self binding property of Paillier
cryptography system, which is described with our notation as follows:
[E(m1, r1) · r J2 ] mod J 2 = E(m1, r1 · r2)
With this property, any cipher-text can be changed to another cipher-text without affecting the plain-text. We utilize
this property for making the job of adversary very difﬁcult to predict the plain-text.
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Table 1. Experimental Setup.
No. of PCs 2
Processor Intel core i7-2600S 2.80GHz
Memory 16GB
File Storage Server Citrix Xen Server 6.2.019
Cloud Environment Cloudera CDH 5.3.0-020
Maximum Data for Storage 1TB
Fig. 3. ρqt for Different Values of Px .
Fig. 4. ρqt for Different Values of Fs .
4.2 Performance analysis
In our scheme, we can set number of quired data blocks and number of challenged data blocks according to user’s
requirement. When users wish to store data for a short period, users can use less number of challenge blocks to reduce
the overload of CSP and TPA.
We have executed our experiment with the setup given in Table 1. We have conﬁgured a TPA group in cloud
environment to perform audit task of the stored ﬁles on the behalf of cloud users.
To measure the performance of the proposed scheme, the ratio of queried data blocks and the total number of data
blocks is computed varying three parameters: detection probability (Px ), ﬁle size (Fs) and audit frequency (A f ). The
ratio is deﬁned as ρqt We have also compared our approach with existing approaches4,8, 9, 14, 16. The experimental
results are given in the following.
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Fig. 5. ρqt for Different Values of Af .
1. Detection Probability (Px): We have computed ρqt for the different values of Px (0.75, 0.80, 0.85 and 0.90).
The experimental results of our approach and existing approaches4,8, 9, 14, 16 are given in Fig. 3. We can see that
for any value of PX our scheme have a less ρqt .
2. File Size (Fs): We have tested our method with different ﬁle size (Fs = 128MB, 256MB, 512MB and 1TB) for
audit purpose and measured ρqt . Figure 4 shows the results of our method as well as existing approaches4,8, 9, 14, 16
with different values Fs . It may be observed that for any value of Fs our scheme produce less ρqt .
3. Audit Frequency (Af ) : In our experiment, we have considered different audit frequency values (A f = 80Hz,
85Hz, 90Hz and 95Hz) to evaluate the proposed scheme and compare with existing approaches4,8, 9, 14, 16.
Experimental results are presented in Fig. 4 which shows that our approach requires lass ρqt than all existing
approaches for all A f values.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we propose a better data integrity veriﬁcation approach which use multiple third party auditors. This
approach uses CBC, PHC and homomorphic tag for data integrity veriﬁcation. Ideally, the approach is suitable for
cloud storage because of the efﬁciency of homomorphic tag and advantages of PHC. Further, our technique supports
dynamic data operations with less overhead. In this approach, CSP server does not require any additional data structure
to manage data operations. It also provides better security in case of Man In The Middle attack (MITM), Trafﬁc
ﬂow analysis, Impersonation , Defacement and misuse of data storage servers, because of the self binding property
of Paillier which can change cipher-text without any modiﬁcation in plain-text and misguide the intruders. Finally,
performance of our approach is not bounded with disk I/O and comparison with existing approaches shows the
effectiveness and usefulness of our approach. Currently, the scheme is tested with limited data size (1TB) and with
limited audit frequency (Max 95Hz). In future, our approach could be extended for large data size and higher audit
frequency.
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